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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction between Government and Enterprises under Carbon Quota Trading Policy
As one of the most efficient means of emission reduction policies, carbon quota trading has a far-reaching impact on the carbon emission reduction of enterprises. Firstly, a two-party evolutionary game model of enterprise and government and a three-party evolutionary game model of enterprise–enterpr...
Autores principales: | Yu, Na, Chen, Jianghua, Cheng, Lei |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
MDPI
2022
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9317222/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35886416 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19148565 |
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