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A general theory of consciousness II: The language problem

It is generally assumed that what we hear in our head is what we think and that, when we tell a thought to somebody else, the other person understands what our thought has been. This paper analyzes how we think and what happens when we communicate our thoughts verbally to others and to ourselves. Th...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Peper, Abraham
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Taylor & Francis 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9361756/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35957841
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19420889.2022.2101194
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author Peper, Abraham
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description It is generally assumed that what we hear in our head is what we think and that, when we tell a thought to somebody else, the other person understands what our thought has been. This paper analyzes how we think and what happens when we communicate our thoughts verbally to others and to ourselves. The assumption that we become conscious in language is erroneous: verbal communication is only an intermediary. The conscious experience of verbal communication is a sensory phenomenon. We think through sensory images (see Part I). This natural way of thinking, is a very refined and accurate method of translating thought into consciousness. It expresses our essentially unconscious neural cognitive activity in conscious sensory images: visual thinkers ‘see’ what they have thought. Why humans use verbal communication to express their thoughts to themselves is difficult to understand as the verbal way is extremely limited. The complex parallel cognitive activity has to be encoded into language tokens which are positioned sequentially as a string of symbols which somehow must express something comparable. Talking to oneself is directed to an imaginary person who is assumed to be the talking person himself. This imaginary person develops with the inner voice in infants and when the child grows up, that imaginary person remains there, somebody he talks to when he thinks and to which he attributes his feelings and his actions. The imaginary person is experienced as the human Self, but actually verbalizes the thoughts of the natural – animal – Self.
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spelling pubmed-93617562022-08-10 A general theory of consciousness II: The language problem Peper, Abraham Commun Integr Biol Research Paper It is generally assumed that what we hear in our head is what we think and that, when we tell a thought to somebody else, the other person understands what our thought has been. This paper analyzes how we think and what happens when we communicate our thoughts verbally to others and to ourselves. The assumption that we become conscious in language is erroneous: verbal communication is only an intermediary. The conscious experience of verbal communication is a sensory phenomenon. We think through sensory images (see Part I). This natural way of thinking, is a very refined and accurate method of translating thought into consciousness. It expresses our essentially unconscious neural cognitive activity in conscious sensory images: visual thinkers ‘see’ what they have thought. Why humans use verbal communication to express their thoughts to themselves is difficult to understand as the verbal way is extremely limited. The complex parallel cognitive activity has to be encoded into language tokens which are positioned sequentially as a string of symbols which somehow must express something comparable. Talking to oneself is directed to an imaginary person who is assumed to be the talking person himself. This imaginary person develops with the inner voice in infants and when the child grows up, that imaginary person remains there, somebody he talks to when he thinks and to which he attributes his feelings and his actions. The imaginary person is experienced as the human Self, but actually verbalizes the thoughts of the natural – animal – Self. Taylor & Francis 2022-08-08 /pmc/articles/PMC9361756/ /pubmed/35957841 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19420889.2022.2101194 Text en © 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) ), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
spellingShingle Research Paper
Peper, Abraham
A general theory of consciousness II: The language problem
title A general theory of consciousness II: The language problem
title_full A general theory of consciousness II: The language problem
title_fullStr A general theory of consciousness II: The language problem
title_full_unstemmed A general theory of consciousness II: The language problem
title_short A general theory of consciousness II: The language problem
title_sort general theory of consciousness ii: the language problem
topic Research Paper
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9361756/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35957841
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19420889.2022.2101194
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