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Manufacturer’s Encroachment and Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions Considering Cap-and-Trade Regulation and Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference

Carbon emission reduction and achieving carbon neutrality has become an inevitable trend in the sustainable development era. We investigate the manufacturer’s encroachment and carbon emission reduction decisions considering government cap-and-trade regulations and consumers’ low-carbon preference. T...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Ding, Fan, Lu, Zhangping, Jin, Mengfan, Sun, Licheng
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9408328/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36012041
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph191610407
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author Ding, Fan
Lu, Zhangping
Jin, Mengfan
Sun, Licheng
author_facet Ding, Fan
Lu, Zhangping
Jin, Mengfan
Sun, Licheng
author_sort Ding, Fan
collection PubMed
description Carbon emission reduction and achieving carbon neutrality has become an inevitable trend in the sustainable development era. We investigate the manufacturer’s encroachment and carbon emission reduction decisions considering government cap-and-trade regulations and consumers’ low-carbon preference. The equilibrium decisions for the four scenarios are analytically obtained and compared based using the Stackelberg game. A comparison with and without cap-and-trade regulation under two encroachment decisions regarding member’s profits and carbon emission reduction levels are conducted. It is shown that the encroachment decision is always advantageous for the manufacturer if the government decides not to implement cap-and-trade regulation, and the retailer always loses profit. Moreover, if the carbon quota is sufficient, cap-and-trade regulation benefits the manufacturer. Otherwise, the manufacturer’s encroachment decision depends on the appropriate initial unit amount of carbon emission and unit carbon price. The retailer’s profit may not always be hurt by the manufacturer’s encroachment with cap-and-trade regulation; unless the unit carbon price exceeds a certain threshold, a higher consumer’s low-carbon preference in the encroachment scenario reduces more carbon emissions than in the no-encroachment scenario for the manufacturer. Further, the rising platform commission rate causes the platform profit to increase first and then decrease; the platform profit will slightly decrease if both products become more substitutes.
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spelling pubmed-94083282022-08-26 Manufacturer’s Encroachment and Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions Considering Cap-and-Trade Regulation and Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference Ding, Fan Lu, Zhangping Jin, Mengfan Sun, Licheng Int J Environ Res Public Health Article Carbon emission reduction and achieving carbon neutrality has become an inevitable trend in the sustainable development era. We investigate the manufacturer’s encroachment and carbon emission reduction decisions considering government cap-and-trade regulations and consumers’ low-carbon preference. The equilibrium decisions for the four scenarios are analytically obtained and compared based using the Stackelberg game. A comparison with and without cap-and-trade regulation under two encroachment decisions regarding member’s profits and carbon emission reduction levels are conducted. It is shown that the encroachment decision is always advantageous for the manufacturer if the government decides not to implement cap-and-trade regulation, and the retailer always loses profit. Moreover, if the carbon quota is sufficient, cap-and-trade regulation benefits the manufacturer. Otherwise, the manufacturer’s encroachment decision depends on the appropriate initial unit amount of carbon emission and unit carbon price. The retailer’s profit may not always be hurt by the manufacturer’s encroachment with cap-and-trade regulation; unless the unit carbon price exceeds a certain threshold, a higher consumer’s low-carbon preference in the encroachment scenario reduces more carbon emissions than in the no-encroachment scenario for the manufacturer. Further, the rising platform commission rate causes the platform profit to increase first and then decrease; the platform profit will slightly decrease if both products become more substitutes. MDPI 2022-08-21 /pmc/articles/PMC9408328/ /pubmed/36012041 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph191610407 Text en © 2022 by the authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Ding, Fan
Lu, Zhangping
Jin, Mengfan
Sun, Licheng
Manufacturer’s Encroachment and Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions Considering Cap-and-Trade Regulation and Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference
title Manufacturer’s Encroachment and Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions Considering Cap-and-Trade Regulation and Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference
title_full Manufacturer’s Encroachment and Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions Considering Cap-and-Trade Regulation and Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference
title_fullStr Manufacturer’s Encroachment and Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions Considering Cap-and-Trade Regulation and Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference
title_full_unstemmed Manufacturer’s Encroachment and Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions Considering Cap-and-Trade Regulation and Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference
title_short Manufacturer’s Encroachment and Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions Considering Cap-and-Trade Regulation and Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference
title_sort manufacturer’s encroachment and carbon emission reduction decisions considering cap-and-trade regulation and consumers’ low-carbon preference
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9408328/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36012041
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph191610407
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