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How to motivate planners to participate in community micro-renewal: An evolutionary game analysis
In China, grassroots governments have attempted to introduce community planners into community micro-renewal, using their expertise to guide the design and implementation of community micro-renewal. However, issues remain to be studied and resolved, including how to effectively play the community pl...
Autores principales: | , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2022
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9442052/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36072033 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.943958 |
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author | Wang, Dong Wu, Meiling Qu, Jiulong Fan, Yuncui |
author_facet | Wang, Dong Wu, Meiling Qu, Jiulong Fan, Yuncui |
author_sort | Wang, Dong |
collection | PubMed |
description | In China, grassroots governments have attempted to introduce community planners into community micro-renewal, using their expertise to guide the design and implementation of community micro-renewal. However, issues remain to be studied and resolved, including how to effectively play the community planner role to coordinate multiple parties’ interests. This study constructed an evolutionary game model based on the behaviors of multiple subjects with participation by community planners, to establish the payment functions on both sides of the game under different choice strategies; explore evolutionary stabilization strategies by replication dynamic equations; and to analyze the conditions for the multi-party evolutionary game to reach the ideal stable state. The findings: (1) Show that financial subsidies provided by the grassroots government to community planners have a positive effect on the latter’s behavioral choices; (2) Illustrate the path of the tripartite evolutionary game among the grassroots government, residents, and community planners to reach ideal stability (incentive, active participation, and positive promotion); and (3) Describe how the project benefits from community planners promoting community micro-renewal can effectively promote their positive behavioral choices. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-9442052 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2022 |
publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-94420522022-09-06 How to motivate planners to participate in community micro-renewal: An evolutionary game analysis Wang, Dong Wu, Meiling Qu, Jiulong Fan, Yuncui Front Psychol Psychology In China, grassroots governments have attempted to introduce community planners into community micro-renewal, using their expertise to guide the design and implementation of community micro-renewal. However, issues remain to be studied and resolved, including how to effectively play the community planner role to coordinate multiple parties’ interests. This study constructed an evolutionary game model based on the behaviors of multiple subjects with participation by community planners, to establish the payment functions on both sides of the game under different choice strategies; explore evolutionary stabilization strategies by replication dynamic equations; and to analyze the conditions for the multi-party evolutionary game to reach the ideal stable state. The findings: (1) Show that financial subsidies provided by the grassroots government to community planners have a positive effect on the latter’s behavioral choices; (2) Illustrate the path of the tripartite evolutionary game among the grassroots government, residents, and community planners to reach ideal stability (incentive, active participation, and positive promotion); and (3) Describe how the project benefits from community planners promoting community micro-renewal can effectively promote their positive behavioral choices. Frontiers Media S.A. 2022-08-22 /pmc/articles/PMC9442052/ /pubmed/36072033 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.943958 Text en Copyright © 2022 Wang, Wu, Qu and Fan. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. |
spellingShingle | Psychology Wang, Dong Wu, Meiling Qu, Jiulong Fan, Yuncui How to motivate planners to participate in community micro-renewal: An evolutionary game analysis |
title | How to motivate planners to participate in community micro-renewal: An evolutionary game analysis |
title_full | How to motivate planners to participate in community micro-renewal: An evolutionary game analysis |
title_fullStr | How to motivate planners to participate in community micro-renewal: An evolutionary game analysis |
title_full_unstemmed | How to motivate planners to participate in community micro-renewal: An evolutionary game analysis |
title_short | How to motivate planners to participate in community micro-renewal: An evolutionary game analysis |
title_sort | how to motivate planners to participate in community micro-renewal: an evolutionary game analysis |
topic | Psychology |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9442052/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36072033 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.943958 |
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