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The impact of penalty and subsidy mechanisms on the decisions of the government, businesses, and consumers during COVID-19 ——Tripartite evolutionary game theory analysis
PURPOSE: – Based on the fact that punishment and subsidy mechanisms affect the anti-epidemic incentives of major participants in a society, the issue of this paper is how the penalty and subsidy mechanisms affect the decisions of governments, businesses, and consumers during Corona Virus Disease 201...
Autores principales: | , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.
2022
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9534545/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orp.2022.100255 |
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author | Zhou, Yuxun Rahman, Mohammad Mafizur Khanam, Rasheda Taylor, Brad R. |
author_facet | Zhou, Yuxun Rahman, Mohammad Mafizur Khanam, Rasheda Taylor, Brad R. |
author_sort | Zhou, Yuxun |
collection | PubMed |
description | PURPOSE: – Based on the fact that punishment and subsidy mechanisms affect the anti-epidemic incentives of major participants in a society, the issue of this paper is how the penalty and subsidy mechanisms affect the decisions of governments, businesses, and consumers during Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). DESIGN/METHODOLOGY/APPROACH: - This paper proposes a tripartite evolutionary game theory, involving governments, businesses, and consumers, to analyze the evolutionary stable strategies and the impact of penalty and subsidy mechanism on their strategy selection during COVID-19. We then uses numerical analysis to simulate the strategy formation process of governments, businesses, and consumers for the results of tripartite evolutionary game theory. FINDINGS: – This paper suggests that there are four evolutionary stable strategies corresponding to the actual anti-epidemic situations. We find that different subsidy and penalty mechanisms lead to different evolutionary stable strategies. High penalties for businesses and consumers can prompt them to choose active prevention strategies no matter what the subsidy mechanism is. For the government, the penalty mechanism is better than the subsidy mechanism, because the excessive subsidy mechanism will raise the government expenditure. The punishment mechanism is more effective than the subsidy mechanism in realizing the tripartite joint prevention of the COVID-19. Therefore, the implementation of strict punishment mechanism should be a major government measure under COVID-19. ORIGINALITY/VALUE: - Our paper extends the existing theoretical work. We use political economy to make the preference hypothesis, and we explicitly state the effect of subsidy and penalty mechanisms on the decision making of participants and compare their applicability. This is the work that the existing literature did not complete before. Our findings can provide an important theoretical and decision-making basis for COVID-19 prevention and control. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-9534545 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2022 |
publisher | The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-95345452022-10-06 The impact of penalty and subsidy mechanisms on the decisions of the government, businesses, and consumers during COVID-19 ——Tripartite evolutionary game theory analysis Zhou, Yuxun Rahman, Mohammad Mafizur Khanam, Rasheda Taylor, Brad R. Operations Research Perspectives Article PURPOSE: – Based on the fact that punishment and subsidy mechanisms affect the anti-epidemic incentives of major participants in a society, the issue of this paper is how the penalty and subsidy mechanisms affect the decisions of governments, businesses, and consumers during Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). DESIGN/METHODOLOGY/APPROACH: - This paper proposes a tripartite evolutionary game theory, involving governments, businesses, and consumers, to analyze the evolutionary stable strategies and the impact of penalty and subsidy mechanism on their strategy selection during COVID-19. We then uses numerical analysis to simulate the strategy formation process of governments, businesses, and consumers for the results of tripartite evolutionary game theory. FINDINGS: – This paper suggests that there are four evolutionary stable strategies corresponding to the actual anti-epidemic situations. We find that different subsidy and penalty mechanisms lead to different evolutionary stable strategies. High penalties for businesses and consumers can prompt them to choose active prevention strategies no matter what the subsidy mechanism is. For the government, the penalty mechanism is better than the subsidy mechanism, because the excessive subsidy mechanism will raise the government expenditure. The punishment mechanism is more effective than the subsidy mechanism in realizing the tripartite joint prevention of the COVID-19. Therefore, the implementation of strict punishment mechanism should be a major government measure under COVID-19. ORIGINALITY/VALUE: - Our paper extends the existing theoretical work. We use political economy to make the preference hypothesis, and we explicitly state the effect of subsidy and penalty mechanisms on the decision making of participants and compare their applicability. This is the work that the existing literature did not complete before. Our findings can provide an important theoretical and decision-making basis for COVID-19 prevention and control. The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. 2022 2022-10-05 /pmc/articles/PMC9534545/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orp.2022.100255 Text en © 2022 The Author(s) Since January 2020 Elsevier has created a COVID-19 resource centre with free information in English and Mandarin on the novel coronavirus COVID-19. The COVID-19 resource centre is hosted on Elsevier Connect, the company's public news and information website. Elsevier hereby grants permission to make all its COVID-19-related research that is available on the COVID-19 resource centre - including this research content - immediately available in PubMed Central and other publicly funded repositories, such as the WHO COVID database with rights for unrestricted research re-use and analyses in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for free by Elsevier for as long as the COVID-19 resource centre remains active. |
spellingShingle | Article Zhou, Yuxun Rahman, Mohammad Mafizur Khanam, Rasheda Taylor, Brad R. The impact of penalty and subsidy mechanisms on the decisions of the government, businesses, and consumers during COVID-19 ——Tripartite evolutionary game theory analysis |
title | The impact of penalty and subsidy mechanisms on the decisions of the government, businesses, and consumers during COVID-19 ——Tripartite evolutionary game theory analysis |
title_full | The impact of penalty and subsidy mechanisms on the decisions of the government, businesses, and consumers during COVID-19 ——Tripartite evolutionary game theory analysis |
title_fullStr | The impact of penalty and subsidy mechanisms on the decisions of the government, businesses, and consumers during COVID-19 ——Tripartite evolutionary game theory analysis |
title_full_unstemmed | The impact of penalty and subsidy mechanisms on the decisions of the government, businesses, and consumers during COVID-19 ——Tripartite evolutionary game theory analysis |
title_short | The impact of penalty and subsidy mechanisms on the decisions of the government, businesses, and consumers during COVID-19 ——Tripartite evolutionary game theory analysis |
title_sort | impact of penalty and subsidy mechanisms on the decisions of the government, businesses, and consumers during covid-19 ——tripartite evolutionary game theory analysis |
topic | Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9534545/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orp.2022.100255 |
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