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From analytic to synthetic-organizational pluralisms: A pluralistic enactive psychiatry

INTRODUCTION: Reliance on sole reductionism, whether explanatory, methodological or ontological, is difficult to support in clinical psychiatry. Rather, psychiatry is challenged by a plurality of approaches. There exist multiple legitimate ways of understanding human functionality and disorder, i.e....

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Autores principales: Gauld, Christophe, Nielsen, Kristopher, Job, Manon, Bottemanne, Hugo, Dumas, Guillaume
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Frontiers Media S.A. 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9551055/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36238942
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2022.981787
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author Gauld, Christophe
Nielsen, Kristopher
Job, Manon
Bottemanne, Hugo
Dumas, Guillaume
author_facet Gauld, Christophe
Nielsen, Kristopher
Job, Manon
Bottemanne, Hugo
Dumas, Guillaume
author_sort Gauld, Christophe
collection PubMed
description INTRODUCTION: Reliance on sole reductionism, whether explanatory, methodological or ontological, is difficult to support in clinical psychiatry. Rather, psychiatry is challenged by a plurality of approaches. There exist multiple legitimate ways of understanding human functionality and disorder, i.e., different systems of representation, different tools, different methodologies and objectives. Pluralistic frameworks have been presented through which the multiplicity of approaches in psychiatry can be understood. In parallel of these frameworks, an enactive approach for psychiatry has been proposed. In this paper, we consider the relationships between the different kinds of pluralistic frameworks and this enactive approach for psychiatry. METHODS: We compare the enactive approach in psychiatry with wider analytical forms of pluralism. RESULTS: On one side, the enactive framework anchored both in cognitive sciences, theory of dynamic systems, systems biology, and phenomenology, has recently been proposed as an answer to the challenge of an integrative psychiatry. On the other side, two forms of explanatory pluralisms can be described: a non-integrative pluralism and an integrative pluralism. The first is tolerant, it examines the coexistence of different potentially incompatible or untranslatable systems in the scientific or clinical landscape. The second is integrative and proposes to bring together the different levels of understanding and systems of representations. We propose that enactivism is inherently a form of integrative pluralism, but it is at the same time a component of the general framework of explanatory pluralism, composed of a set of so-called analytical approaches. CONCLUSIONS: A significant number of mental health professionals are already accepting the variety of clinical and scientific approaches. In this way, a rigorous understanding of the theoretical positioning of psychiatric actors seems necessary to promote quality clinical practice. The study of entanglements between an analytical pluralism and a synthetic-organizational enactivist pluralism could prove fruitful.
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spelling pubmed-95510552022-10-12 From analytic to synthetic-organizational pluralisms: A pluralistic enactive psychiatry Gauld, Christophe Nielsen, Kristopher Job, Manon Bottemanne, Hugo Dumas, Guillaume Front Psychiatry Psychiatry INTRODUCTION: Reliance on sole reductionism, whether explanatory, methodological or ontological, is difficult to support in clinical psychiatry. Rather, psychiatry is challenged by a plurality of approaches. There exist multiple legitimate ways of understanding human functionality and disorder, i.e., different systems of representation, different tools, different methodologies and objectives. Pluralistic frameworks have been presented through which the multiplicity of approaches in psychiatry can be understood. In parallel of these frameworks, an enactive approach for psychiatry has been proposed. In this paper, we consider the relationships between the different kinds of pluralistic frameworks and this enactive approach for psychiatry. METHODS: We compare the enactive approach in psychiatry with wider analytical forms of pluralism. RESULTS: On one side, the enactive framework anchored both in cognitive sciences, theory of dynamic systems, systems biology, and phenomenology, has recently been proposed as an answer to the challenge of an integrative psychiatry. On the other side, two forms of explanatory pluralisms can be described: a non-integrative pluralism and an integrative pluralism. The first is tolerant, it examines the coexistence of different potentially incompatible or untranslatable systems in the scientific or clinical landscape. The second is integrative and proposes to bring together the different levels of understanding and systems of representations. We propose that enactivism is inherently a form of integrative pluralism, but it is at the same time a component of the general framework of explanatory pluralism, composed of a set of so-called analytical approaches. CONCLUSIONS: A significant number of mental health professionals are already accepting the variety of clinical and scientific approaches. In this way, a rigorous understanding of the theoretical positioning of psychiatric actors seems necessary to promote quality clinical practice. The study of entanglements between an analytical pluralism and a synthetic-organizational enactivist pluralism could prove fruitful. Frontiers Media S.A. 2022-09-27 /pmc/articles/PMC9551055/ /pubmed/36238942 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2022.981787 Text en Copyright © 2022 Gauld, Nielsen, Job, Bottemanne and Dumas. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
spellingShingle Psychiatry
Gauld, Christophe
Nielsen, Kristopher
Job, Manon
Bottemanne, Hugo
Dumas, Guillaume
From analytic to synthetic-organizational pluralisms: A pluralistic enactive psychiatry
title From analytic to synthetic-organizational pluralisms: A pluralistic enactive psychiatry
title_full From analytic to synthetic-organizational pluralisms: A pluralistic enactive psychiatry
title_fullStr From analytic to synthetic-organizational pluralisms: A pluralistic enactive psychiatry
title_full_unstemmed From analytic to synthetic-organizational pluralisms: A pluralistic enactive psychiatry
title_short From analytic to synthetic-organizational pluralisms: A pluralistic enactive psychiatry
title_sort from analytic to synthetic-organizational pluralisms: a pluralistic enactive psychiatry
topic Psychiatry
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9551055/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36238942
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2022.981787
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