Tripartite Evolutionary Game of Agricultural Service Scale Management and Small Farmers' Interests under Government Preferential Policies

In agricultural production with small farmers as the main body, the service scale operation is one of the ways to obtain scale operation benefits. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of agricultural scale service providers (integrators), demand subjects (farmers), and agriculture-related government departments and analyzes the influencing factors, influencing relations, and evolutionary stable equilibrium results of each participant's strategy choice. The results show that improving rewards and punishments and strengthening supervision by agriculture-related government departments will help integrators provide high-quality services and encourage farmers to actively produce and reduce speculation; when the cost difference between high-quality service and low-quality service is large, the probability of high-quality service provided by integrators will be reduced, and the evolution result of low Pareto efficiency may appear in the system; when the speculative cost of farmers is not high, the lobbying efforts of integrators will increase the speculative behavior of farmers. Finally, MATLAB2018a is used to simulate and analyze the validity of the model results, which provides a theoretical reference for the scale operation of agricultural services.