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Intelligent Construction Technology Adoption Driving Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

The adoption of intelligent construction technology (ICT) is regarded as one of the important strategies for the transformation and upgrading of the Chinese construction industry and the achievement of high-quality development. In the ICT adoption process, the government is the driving subject, the...

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Autores principales: Zhang, Jiawei, Li, Lihong
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Hindawi 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9578914/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36267556
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/9372443
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author Zhang, Jiawei
Li, Lihong
author_facet Zhang, Jiawei
Li, Lihong
author_sort Zhang, Jiawei
collection PubMed
description The adoption of intelligent construction technology (ICT) is regarded as one of the important strategies for the transformation and upgrading of the Chinese construction industry and the achievement of high-quality development. In the ICT adoption process, the government is the driving subject, the owner is an important subject, and ICT is applied in practice by the general contractor. This study first analyses the evolutionary process and the impact of participants' strategy choices on the system equilibrium by establishing a tripartite evolutionary game framework which includes the government, the owner, and the general contractor as the main stakeholders; then tests the feasibility and rationality of the model by analysing the ESS corresponding to the three phases of ICT adoption. The results show that the conditions for each ESS to be established mainly depend on the relationship between the costs and benefits of each stakeholder, and that owners are more sensitive to government subsidies and penalties than general contractors, so the government should establish a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism based on the results of the model. High adoption costs are a key barrier to ICT adoption for both owners and general contractors. This paper provides a new framework for research related to ICT adoption and a reference for the strategic adjustment of stakeholders in ICT adoption.
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spelling pubmed-95789142022-10-19 Intelligent Construction Technology Adoption Driving Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis Zhang, Jiawei Li, Lihong J Environ Public Health Research Article The adoption of intelligent construction technology (ICT) is regarded as one of the important strategies for the transformation and upgrading of the Chinese construction industry and the achievement of high-quality development. In the ICT adoption process, the government is the driving subject, the owner is an important subject, and ICT is applied in practice by the general contractor. This study first analyses the evolutionary process and the impact of participants' strategy choices on the system equilibrium by establishing a tripartite evolutionary game framework which includes the government, the owner, and the general contractor as the main stakeholders; then tests the feasibility and rationality of the model by analysing the ESS corresponding to the three phases of ICT adoption. The results show that the conditions for each ESS to be established mainly depend on the relationship between the costs and benefits of each stakeholder, and that owners are more sensitive to government subsidies and penalties than general contractors, so the government should establish a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism based on the results of the model. High adoption costs are a key barrier to ICT adoption for both owners and general contractors. This paper provides a new framework for research related to ICT adoption and a reference for the strategic adjustment of stakeholders in ICT adoption. Hindawi 2022-10-11 /pmc/articles/PMC9578914/ /pubmed/36267556 http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/9372443 Text en Copyright © 2022 Jiawei Zhang and Lihong Li. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
spellingShingle Research Article
Zhang, Jiawei
Li, Lihong
Intelligent Construction Technology Adoption Driving Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis
title Intelligent Construction Technology Adoption Driving Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis
title_full Intelligent Construction Technology Adoption Driving Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis
title_fullStr Intelligent Construction Technology Adoption Driving Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis
title_full_unstemmed Intelligent Construction Technology Adoption Driving Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis
title_short Intelligent Construction Technology Adoption Driving Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis
title_sort intelligent construction technology adoption driving strategy in china: a tripartite evolutionary game analysis
topic Research Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9578914/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36267556
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/9372443
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