On the Information Obtainable from Comparative Judgments

Personality tests employing comparative judgments have been proposed as an alternative to Likert-type rating scales. One of the main advantages of a comparative format is that it can reduce faking of responses in high-stakes situations. However, previous research has shown that it is highly difficult to obtain trait score estimates that are both faking resistant and sufficiently accurate for individual-level diagnostic decisions. With the goal of contributing to a solution, I study the information obtainable from comparative judgments analyzed by means of Thurstonian IRT models. First, I extend the mathematical theory of ordinal comparative judgments and corresponding models. Second, I provide optimal test designs for Thurstonian IRT models that maximize the accuracy of people’s trait score estimates from both frequentist and Bayesian statistical perspectives. Third, I derive analytic upper bounds for the accuracy of these trait estimates achievable through ordinal Thurstonian IRT models. Fourth, I perform numerical experiments that complement results obtained in earlier simulation studies. The combined analytical and numerical results suggest that it is indeed possible to design personality tests using comparative judgments that yield trait scores estimates sufficiently accurate for individual-level diagnostic decisions, while reducing faking in high-stakes situations. Recommendations for the practical application of comparative judgments for the measurement of personality, specifically in high-stakes situations, are given. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11336-022-09843-z.