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Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory
The promotion of general practitioner (GP) contract service is one of the key components of China's healthcare reform. We consider GPs providing primary health services with private competency information over two periods, where patients decide when to sign. Two types of GPs are considered: tho...
Autores principales: | , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2022
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9650283/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36388347 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2022.959032 |
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author | Liu, Jianyue Ma, Zhiqiang Su, Jialu Ge, Bailin |
author_facet | Liu, Jianyue Ma, Zhiqiang Su, Jialu Ge, Bailin |
author_sort | Liu, Jianyue |
collection | PubMed |
description | The promotion of general practitioner (GP) contract service is one of the key components of China's healthcare reform. We consider GPs providing primary health services with private competency information over two periods, where patients decide when to sign. Two types of GPs are considered: those with higher and lower competency. Under asymmetric information, to spur the patients' incentive to sign, the GPs can move to offer competency disclosure schemes to patients, for example, separating or pooling, through which true competency information is revealed, respectively. We investigate three scenarios, which are referred to as “separating-separating,” “pooling-separating,” and “pooling-pooling.” The results of the three scenarios yield intriguing insights into the impact of the GP's competency disclosure decisions. Findings include that GPs prefer the “pooling-separating” strategy, but patients prefer “separating-separating.” Besides, an extremely low cure rate may enable GPs to conceal some competency information. Furthermore, low-competency GPs may exaggerate their competency level for profit, but greater efforts in disclosing competency information may result in diminished benefits. Therefore, to promote the services of GPs, the core is always to improve GPs' competency. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-9650283 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2022 |
publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-96502832022-11-15 Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory Liu, Jianyue Ma, Zhiqiang Su, Jialu Ge, Bailin Front Public Health Public Health The promotion of general practitioner (GP) contract service is one of the key components of China's healthcare reform. We consider GPs providing primary health services with private competency information over two periods, where patients decide when to sign. Two types of GPs are considered: those with higher and lower competency. Under asymmetric information, to spur the patients' incentive to sign, the GPs can move to offer competency disclosure schemes to patients, for example, separating or pooling, through which true competency information is revealed, respectively. We investigate three scenarios, which are referred to as “separating-separating,” “pooling-separating,” and “pooling-pooling.” The results of the three scenarios yield intriguing insights into the impact of the GP's competency disclosure decisions. Findings include that GPs prefer the “pooling-separating” strategy, but patients prefer “separating-separating.” Besides, an extremely low cure rate may enable GPs to conceal some competency information. Furthermore, low-competency GPs may exaggerate their competency level for profit, but greater efforts in disclosing competency information may result in diminished benefits. Therefore, to promote the services of GPs, the core is always to improve GPs' competency. Frontiers Media S.A. 2022-10-28 /pmc/articles/PMC9650283/ /pubmed/36388347 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2022.959032 Text en Copyright © 2022 Liu, Ma, Su and Ge. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. |
spellingShingle | Public Health Liu, Jianyue Ma, Zhiqiang Su, Jialu Ge, Bailin Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory |
title | Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory |
title_full | Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory |
title_fullStr | Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory |
title_full_unstemmed | Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory |
title_short | Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory |
title_sort | optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: from the perspective of signaling theory |
topic | Public Health |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9650283/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36388347 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2022.959032 |
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