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Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory

The promotion of general practitioner (GP) contract service is one of the key components of China's healthcare reform. We consider GPs providing primary health services with private competency information over two periods, where patients decide when to sign. Two types of GPs are considered: tho...

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Autores principales: Liu, Jianyue, Ma, Zhiqiang, Su, Jialu, Ge, Bailin
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Frontiers Media S.A. 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9650283/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36388347
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2022.959032
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author Liu, Jianyue
Ma, Zhiqiang
Su, Jialu
Ge, Bailin
author_facet Liu, Jianyue
Ma, Zhiqiang
Su, Jialu
Ge, Bailin
author_sort Liu, Jianyue
collection PubMed
description The promotion of general practitioner (GP) contract service is one of the key components of China's healthcare reform. We consider GPs providing primary health services with private competency information over two periods, where patients decide when to sign. Two types of GPs are considered: those with higher and lower competency. Under asymmetric information, to spur the patients' incentive to sign, the GPs can move to offer competency disclosure schemes to patients, for example, separating or pooling, through which true competency information is revealed, respectively. We investigate three scenarios, which are referred to as “separating-separating,” “pooling-separating,” and “pooling-pooling.” The results of the three scenarios yield intriguing insights into the impact of the GP's competency disclosure decisions. Findings include that GPs prefer the “pooling-separating” strategy, but patients prefer “separating-separating.” Besides, an extremely low cure rate may enable GPs to conceal some competency information. Furthermore, low-competency GPs may exaggerate their competency level for profit, but greater efforts in disclosing competency information may result in diminished benefits. Therefore, to promote the services of GPs, the core is always to improve GPs' competency.
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spelling pubmed-96502832022-11-15 Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory Liu, Jianyue Ma, Zhiqiang Su, Jialu Ge, Bailin Front Public Health Public Health The promotion of general practitioner (GP) contract service is one of the key components of China's healthcare reform. We consider GPs providing primary health services with private competency information over two periods, where patients decide when to sign. Two types of GPs are considered: those with higher and lower competency. Under asymmetric information, to spur the patients' incentive to sign, the GPs can move to offer competency disclosure schemes to patients, for example, separating or pooling, through which true competency information is revealed, respectively. We investigate three scenarios, which are referred to as “separating-separating,” “pooling-separating,” and “pooling-pooling.” The results of the three scenarios yield intriguing insights into the impact of the GP's competency disclosure decisions. Findings include that GPs prefer the “pooling-separating” strategy, but patients prefer “separating-separating.” Besides, an extremely low cure rate may enable GPs to conceal some competency information. Furthermore, low-competency GPs may exaggerate their competency level for profit, but greater efforts in disclosing competency information may result in diminished benefits. Therefore, to promote the services of GPs, the core is always to improve GPs' competency. Frontiers Media S.A. 2022-10-28 /pmc/articles/PMC9650283/ /pubmed/36388347 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2022.959032 Text en Copyright © 2022 Liu, Ma, Su and Ge. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
spellingShingle Public Health
Liu, Jianyue
Ma, Zhiqiang
Su, Jialu
Ge, Bailin
Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory
title Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory
title_full Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory
title_fullStr Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory
title_full_unstemmed Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory
title_short Optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: From the perspective of signaling theory
title_sort optimal information disclosure strategy in the primary healthcare service market: from the perspective of signaling theory
topic Public Health
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9650283/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36388347
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2022.959032
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