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A game theoretical model for the stimulation of public cooperation in environmental collaborative governance

Digital technologies provide a convenient way for the public to participate in environmental governance. Therefore, by means of a two-stage evolutionary model, a new mechanism for promoting public cooperation is proposed to accomplish environmental collaborative governance. Interactive effects of go...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Fang, Yinhai, Perc, Matjaž, Zhang, Hui
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: The Royal Society 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9653250/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36405643
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.221148
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author Fang, Yinhai
Perc, Matjaž
Zhang, Hui
author_facet Fang, Yinhai
Perc, Matjaž
Zhang, Hui
author_sort Fang, Yinhai
collection PubMed
description Digital technologies provide a convenient way for the public to participate in environmental governance. Therefore, by means of a two-stage evolutionary model, a new mechanism for promoting public cooperation is proposed to accomplish environmental collaborative governance. Interactive effects of government–enterprise environmental governance are firstly explored, which is the external atmosphere for public behaviour. Second, the evolutionary dynamics of public behaviour is analysed to reveal the internal mechanism of the emergence of public cooperation in environmental collaborative governance projects. Simulations reveal that the interaction of resource elements between government and enterprise is an important basis for environmental governance performance, and that governments can improve this as well as public cooperation by increasing the marginal governance propensity. Similarly, an increase in the government's fixed expenditure item of environmental governance can also significantly improve government–enterprise performance and public cooperation. And finally, the effect of government's marginal incentive propensity on public environmental governance is moderated by enterprises' marginal environmental governance propensity, so that simply increasing the government's marginal incentive propensity cannot improve the evolutionary stable state of public behaviour under the scenario where enterprises’ marginal environmental governance propensity is low.
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spelling pubmed-96532502022-11-17 A game theoretical model for the stimulation of public cooperation in environmental collaborative governance Fang, Yinhai Perc, Matjaž Zhang, Hui R Soc Open Sci Mathematics Digital technologies provide a convenient way for the public to participate in environmental governance. Therefore, by means of a two-stage evolutionary model, a new mechanism for promoting public cooperation is proposed to accomplish environmental collaborative governance. Interactive effects of government–enterprise environmental governance are firstly explored, which is the external atmosphere for public behaviour. Second, the evolutionary dynamics of public behaviour is analysed to reveal the internal mechanism of the emergence of public cooperation in environmental collaborative governance projects. Simulations reveal that the interaction of resource elements between government and enterprise is an important basis for environmental governance performance, and that governments can improve this as well as public cooperation by increasing the marginal governance propensity. Similarly, an increase in the government's fixed expenditure item of environmental governance can also significantly improve government–enterprise performance and public cooperation. And finally, the effect of government's marginal incentive propensity on public environmental governance is moderated by enterprises' marginal environmental governance propensity, so that simply increasing the government's marginal incentive propensity cannot improve the evolutionary stable state of public behaviour under the scenario where enterprises’ marginal environmental governance propensity is low. The Royal Society 2022-11-09 /pmc/articles/PMC9653250/ /pubmed/36405643 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.221148 Text en © 2022 The Authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) , which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and source are credited.
spellingShingle Mathematics
Fang, Yinhai
Perc, Matjaž
Zhang, Hui
A game theoretical model for the stimulation of public cooperation in environmental collaborative governance
title A game theoretical model for the stimulation of public cooperation in environmental collaborative governance
title_full A game theoretical model for the stimulation of public cooperation in environmental collaborative governance
title_fullStr A game theoretical model for the stimulation of public cooperation in environmental collaborative governance
title_full_unstemmed A game theoretical model for the stimulation of public cooperation in environmental collaborative governance
title_short A game theoretical model for the stimulation of public cooperation in environmental collaborative governance
title_sort game theoretical model for the stimulation of public cooperation in environmental collaborative governance
topic Mathematics
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9653250/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36405643
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.221148
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