Cargando…

An evolutionary game model of individual choices and bed net use: elucidating key aspect in malaria elimination strategies

Insecticide-treated net (ITN) is the most applicable and cost-effective malaria intervention measure in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere. Although ITNs have been widely distributed to malaria-endemic regions in the past, their success has been threatened by misuses (in fishing, agriculture etc.) and...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Laxmi, Ngonghala, Calistus N., Bhattacharyya, Samit
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: The Royal Society 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9667140/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36405633
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.220685
_version_ 1784831664327753728
author Laxmi,
Ngonghala, Calistus N.
Bhattacharyya, Samit
author_facet Laxmi,
Ngonghala, Calistus N.
Bhattacharyya, Samit
author_sort Laxmi,
collection PubMed
description Insecticide-treated net (ITN) is the most applicable and cost-effective malaria intervention measure in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere. Although ITNs have been widely distributed to malaria-endemic regions in the past, their success has been threatened by misuses (in fishing, agriculture etc.) and decay in ITN efficacy. Decision-making in using the ITNs depends on multiple coevolving factors: malaria prevalence, mosquito density, ITN availability and its efficacy, and other socio-economic determinants. While ITN misuse increases as the efficacy of ITNs declines, high efficacy also impedes proper use due to free-riding. This irrational usage leads to increased malaria prevalence, thereby worsening malaria control efforts. It also remains unclear if the optimum ITN use for malaria elimination can be achieved under such an adaptive social learning process. Here, we incorporate evolutionary game theory into a disease transmission model to demonstrate these behavioural interactions and their impact on malaria prevalence. We show that social optimum usage is a function of transmission potential, ITN efficacy and mosquito demography. Under specific parameter regimes, our model exhibits patterns of ITN usage similar to observed data from parts of Africa. Our study suggests that the provision of financial incentives as prompt feedback to improper ITN use can reduce misuse and contribute positively towards malaria elimination efforts in Africa and elsewhere.
format Online
Article
Text
id pubmed-9667140
institution National Center for Biotechnology Information
language English
publishDate 2022
publisher The Royal Society
record_format MEDLINE/PubMed
spelling pubmed-96671402022-11-17 An evolutionary game model of individual choices and bed net use: elucidating key aspect in malaria elimination strategies Laxmi, Ngonghala, Calistus N. Bhattacharyya, Samit R Soc Open Sci Mathematics Insecticide-treated net (ITN) is the most applicable and cost-effective malaria intervention measure in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere. Although ITNs have been widely distributed to malaria-endemic regions in the past, their success has been threatened by misuses (in fishing, agriculture etc.) and decay in ITN efficacy. Decision-making in using the ITNs depends on multiple coevolving factors: malaria prevalence, mosquito density, ITN availability and its efficacy, and other socio-economic determinants. While ITN misuse increases as the efficacy of ITNs declines, high efficacy also impedes proper use due to free-riding. This irrational usage leads to increased malaria prevalence, thereby worsening malaria control efforts. It also remains unclear if the optimum ITN use for malaria elimination can be achieved under such an adaptive social learning process. Here, we incorporate evolutionary game theory into a disease transmission model to demonstrate these behavioural interactions and their impact on malaria prevalence. We show that social optimum usage is a function of transmission potential, ITN efficacy and mosquito demography. Under specific parameter regimes, our model exhibits patterns of ITN usage similar to observed data from parts of Africa. Our study suggests that the provision of financial incentives as prompt feedback to improper ITN use can reduce misuse and contribute positively towards malaria elimination efforts in Africa and elsewhere. The Royal Society 2022-11-16 /pmc/articles/PMC9667140/ /pubmed/36405633 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.220685 Text en © 2022 The Authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) , which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and source are credited.
spellingShingle Mathematics
Laxmi,
Ngonghala, Calistus N.
Bhattacharyya, Samit
An evolutionary game model of individual choices and bed net use: elucidating key aspect in malaria elimination strategies
title An evolutionary game model of individual choices and bed net use: elucidating key aspect in malaria elimination strategies
title_full An evolutionary game model of individual choices and bed net use: elucidating key aspect in malaria elimination strategies
title_fullStr An evolutionary game model of individual choices and bed net use: elucidating key aspect in malaria elimination strategies
title_full_unstemmed An evolutionary game model of individual choices and bed net use: elucidating key aspect in malaria elimination strategies
title_short An evolutionary game model of individual choices and bed net use: elucidating key aspect in malaria elimination strategies
title_sort evolutionary game model of individual choices and bed net use: elucidating key aspect in malaria elimination strategies
topic Mathematics
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9667140/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36405633
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.220685
work_keys_str_mv AT laxmi anevolutionarygamemodelofindividualchoicesandbednetuseelucidatingkeyaspectinmalariaeliminationstrategies
AT ngonghalacalistusn anevolutionarygamemodelofindividualchoicesandbednetuseelucidatingkeyaspectinmalariaeliminationstrategies
AT bhattacharyyasamit anevolutionarygamemodelofindividualchoicesandbednetuseelucidatingkeyaspectinmalariaeliminationstrategies
AT laxmi evolutionarygamemodelofindividualchoicesandbednetuseelucidatingkeyaspectinmalariaeliminationstrategies
AT ngonghalacalistusn evolutionarygamemodelofindividualchoicesandbednetuseelucidatingkeyaspectinmalariaeliminationstrategies
AT bhattacharyyasamit evolutionarygamemodelofindividualchoicesandbednetuseelucidatingkeyaspectinmalariaeliminationstrategies