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Patent Licensing and Capacity in a Cournot Model
We consider the problem of patent licensing in a Cournot duopoly in which the innovator (patentee) is one of the firms and it is capacity constrained. We show that when the patentee can produce a relatively small (relatively large) quantity, it prefers licensing by means of a fixed fee (unit royalty...
Autores principales: | Colombo, Stefano, Filippini, Luigi, Sen, Debapriya |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Springer US
2022
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9672582/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36415775 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-022-09886-7 |
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