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Migrations of Trust: Reasonable Trust and Epistemic Transgressions
Despite an immense amount of literature on the topic of trust, there is still no account that offers a plausible epistemological framework for the phenomenon of reasonable trust. The main claim of this article is that reasonable trust and distrust are phenomena based upon practical knowledge, while...
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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Springer Netherlands
2022
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Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9676884/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36438624 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10746-022-09651-5 |
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author | Franeta, Duška |
author_facet | Franeta, Duška |
author_sort | Franeta, Duška |
collection | PubMed |
description | Despite an immense amount of literature on the topic of trust, there is still no account that offers a plausible epistemological framework for the phenomenon of reasonable trust. The main claim of this article is that reasonable trust and distrust are phenomena based upon practical knowledge, while non-reasonable trust and distrust result from dislocation of trust into different epistemic regimes. This dislocation can be observed in some of the influential theories such as cognitive and emotional accounts of trust and in the accounts understanding trust as a form of faith. Added to that, theoretical approaches introducing a strong idea of basic trust preclude observing the difference between reasonable and non-reasonable trust. In this article, I argue that reasonable trust is founded upon practical knowledge which includes knowledge of integrity of the trusted person and knowledge about a similarity of worldviews of the trust giver and the trust receiver. Furthermore, I elaborate on the ways reasonable trust and distrust are being transformed and disfigured in other epistemic regimes. Drawing mainly upon Aristotelian understanding of practical knowledge, I want to show how non-reasonable trust and distrust are manifested in the phenomena of blind trust, unconditional trust and absolute doubt and explain why non-reasonable trust and distrust can hardly be distinguished from loyalty, subordination, infatuation or calculation. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-9676884 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2022 |
publisher | Springer Netherlands |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-96768842022-11-21 Migrations of Trust: Reasonable Trust and Epistemic Transgressions Franeta, Duška Hum Stud Theoretical / Philosophical Paper Despite an immense amount of literature on the topic of trust, there is still no account that offers a plausible epistemological framework for the phenomenon of reasonable trust. The main claim of this article is that reasonable trust and distrust are phenomena based upon practical knowledge, while non-reasonable trust and distrust result from dislocation of trust into different epistemic regimes. This dislocation can be observed in some of the influential theories such as cognitive and emotional accounts of trust and in the accounts understanding trust as a form of faith. Added to that, theoretical approaches introducing a strong idea of basic trust preclude observing the difference between reasonable and non-reasonable trust. In this article, I argue that reasonable trust is founded upon practical knowledge which includes knowledge of integrity of the trusted person and knowledge about a similarity of worldviews of the trust giver and the trust receiver. Furthermore, I elaborate on the ways reasonable trust and distrust are being transformed and disfigured in other epistemic regimes. Drawing mainly upon Aristotelian understanding of practical knowledge, I want to show how non-reasonable trust and distrust are manifested in the phenomena of blind trust, unconditional trust and absolute doubt and explain why non-reasonable trust and distrust can hardly be distinguished from loyalty, subordination, infatuation or calculation. Springer Netherlands 2022-11-19 2022 /pmc/articles/PMC9676884/ /pubmed/36438624 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10746-022-09651-5 Text en © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2022, Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. This article is made available via the PMC Open Access Subset for unrestricted research re-use and secondary analysis in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for the duration of the World Health Organization (WHO) declaration of COVID-19 as a global pandemic. |
spellingShingle | Theoretical / Philosophical Paper Franeta, Duška Migrations of Trust: Reasonable Trust and Epistemic Transgressions |
title | Migrations of Trust: Reasonable Trust and Epistemic Transgressions |
title_full | Migrations of Trust: Reasonable Trust and Epistemic Transgressions |
title_fullStr | Migrations of Trust: Reasonable Trust and Epistemic Transgressions |
title_full_unstemmed | Migrations of Trust: Reasonable Trust and Epistemic Transgressions |
title_short | Migrations of Trust: Reasonable Trust and Epistemic Transgressions |
title_sort | migrations of trust: reasonable trust and epistemic transgressions |
topic | Theoretical / Philosophical Paper |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9676884/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36438624 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10746-022-09651-5 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT franetaduska migrationsoftrustreasonabletrustandepistemictransgressions |