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Biodefense and emergency use authorization: different originations, purposes, and evolutionary paths of institutions in the United States and South Korea

BACKGROUND: Emergency-use-authorization (EUA) is the representative biodefense policy that allows the use of unlicensed medical countermeasures or off-label use of approved medical countermeasures in response to public health emergencies. This article aims to determine why the EUA policies of the Un...

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Autor principal: Kim, HyunJung
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: BioMed Central 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9721072/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36471373
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12992-022-00895-5
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author Kim, HyunJung
author_facet Kim, HyunJung
author_sort Kim, HyunJung
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description BACKGROUND: Emergency-use-authorization (EUA) is the representative biodefense policy that allows the use of unlicensed medical countermeasures or off-label use of approved medical countermeasures in response to public health emergencies. This article aims to determine why the EUA policies of the United States and South Korea produced drastically different outcomes during the COVID-19 pandemic, and how these outcomes were determined by the originations and evolutionary paths of the two policies. METHOD: Historical institutionalism (HI) explains institutional changes—that is, how the institution is born and how it evolves—based on the concept of path dependency. However, the HI analytical narratives remain at the meso level of analysis in the context of structure and agency. This article discusses domestic and policy-level factors related to the origination of the biodefense institutions in the United States and South Korea using policy-learning concepts with the Event-related Policy Change Model. RESULTS: The 2001 anthrax letter attack (Amerithrax) and the 2015 Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) outbreak prompted the establishment of biodefense institutions in the United States and South Korea, respectively. Due to the different departure points and the mechanism of path dependency, the two countries’ EUAs evolved in different ways—the United States EUA reinforced the Post-Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP) function, while the South Korea EUA strengthened the Non-Pharmaceutical Intervention (NPI) function. CONCLUSIONS: The evolution and outcomes of the two EUAs are different because both policies were born out of different needs. The United States EUA is primarily oriented toward protecting homeland security against CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) threats, whereas the South Korea EUA is specifically designed for disease prevention against infectious disease outbreak.
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spelling pubmed-97210722022-12-06 Biodefense and emergency use authorization: different originations, purposes, and evolutionary paths of institutions in the United States and South Korea Kim, HyunJung Global Health Research BACKGROUND: Emergency-use-authorization (EUA) is the representative biodefense policy that allows the use of unlicensed medical countermeasures or off-label use of approved medical countermeasures in response to public health emergencies. This article aims to determine why the EUA policies of the United States and South Korea produced drastically different outcomes during the COVID-19 pandemic, and how these outcomes were determined by the originations and evolutionary paths of the two policies. METHOD: Historical institutionalism (HI) explains institutional changes—that is, how the institution is born and how it evolves—based on the concept of path dependency. However, the HI analytical narratives remain at the meso level of analysis in the context of structure and agency. This article discusses domestic and policy-level factors related to the origination of the biodefense institutions in the United States and South Korea using policy-learning concepts with the Event-related Policy Change Model. RESULTS: The 2001 anthrax letter attack (Amerithrax) and the 2015 Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) outbreak prompted the establishment of biodefense institutions in the United States and South Korea, respectively. Due to the different departure points and the mechanism of path dependency, the two countries’ EUAs evolved in different ways—the United States EUA reinforced the Post-Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP) function, while the South Korea EUA strengthened the Non-Pharmaceutical Intervention (NPI) function. CONCLUSIONS: The evolution and outcomes of the two EUAs are different because both policies were born out of different needs. The United States EUA is primarily oriented toward protecting homeland security against CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) threats, whereas the South Korea EUA is specifically designed for disease prevention against infectious disease outbreak. BioMed Central 2022-12-05 /pmc/articles/PMC9721072/ /pubmed/36471373 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12992-022-00895-5 Text en © The Author(s) 2022 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Open AccessThis article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) . The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) ) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data.
spellingShingle Research
Kim, HyunJung
Biodefense and emergency use authorization: different originations, purposes, and evolutionary paths of institutions in the United States and South Korea
title Biodefense and emergency use authorization: different originations, purposes, and evolutionary paths of institutions in the United States and South Korea
title_full Biodefense and emergency use authorization: different originations, purposes, and evolutionary paths of institutions in the United States and South Korea
title_fullStr Biodefense and emergency use authorization: different originations, purposes, and evolutionary paths of institutions in the United States and South Korea
title_full_unstemmed Biodefense and emergency use authorization: different originations, purposes, and evolutionary paths of institutions in the United States and South Korea
title_short Biodefense and emergency use authorization: different originations, purposes, and evolutionary paths of institutions in the United States and South Korea
title_sort biodefense and emergency use authorization: different originations, purposes, and evolutionary paths of institutions in the united states and south korea
topic Research
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9721072/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36471373
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12992-022-00895-5
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