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An empirical perspective on moral expertise: Evidence from a global study of philosophers
Considerable attention in bioethics has been devoted to moral expertise and its implications for handling applied moral problems. The existence and nature of moral expertise has been a contested topic, and particularly, whether philosophers are moral experts. In this study, we put the question of ph...
Autores principales: | , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
John Wiley and Sons Inc.
2022
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9804195/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35971892 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13079 |
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author | Niv, Yarden Sulitzeanu‐Kenan, Raanan |
author_facet | Niv, Yarden Sulitzeanu‐Kenan, Raanan |
author_sort | Niv, Yarden |
collection | PubMed |
description | Considerable attention in bioethics has been devoted to moral expertise and its implications for handling applied moral problems. The existence and nature of moral expertise has been a contested topic, and particularly, whether philosophers are moral experts. In this study, we put the question of philosophers’ moral expertise in a wider context, utilizing a novel and global study among 4,087 philosophers from 96 countries. We find that despite the skepticism in recent literature, the vast majority of philosophers do believe in moral expertise and in the contribution of philosophical training and experience to its acquisition. Yet, they still differ on what philosophers’ moral expertise consists of. While they widely accept that philosophers possess superior analytic abilities regarding moral matters, they diverge on whether they also possess improved ability to judge moral problems. Nonetheless, most philosophers in our sample believe that philosophers possess an improved ability to both analyze and judge moral problems and that they commonly see these two capacities as going hand in hand. We also point at significant associations between personal and professional attributes and philosophers’ beliefs, such as age, working in the field of moral philosophy, public involvement, and association with the analytic tradition. We discuss the implications of these findings for the debate about moral expertise. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-9804195 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2022 |
publisher | John Wiley and Sons Inc. |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-98041952023-01-03 An empirical perspective on moral expertise: Evidence from a global study of philosophers Niv, Yarden Sulitzeanu‐Kenan, Raanan Bioethics Original Articles Considerable attention in bioethics has been devoted to moral expertise and its implications for handling applied moral problems. The existence and nature of moral expertise has been a contested topic, and particularly, whether philosophers are moral experts. In this study, we put the question of philosophers’ moral expertise in a wider context, utilizing a novel and global study among 4,087 philosophers from 96 countries. We find that despite the skepticism in recent literature, the vast majority of philosophers do believe in moral expertise and in the contribution of philosophical training and experience to its acquisition. Yet, they still differ on what philosophers’ moral expertise consists of. While they widely accept that philosophers possess superior analytic abilities regarding moral matters, they diverge on whether they also possess improved ability to judge moral problems. Nonetheless, most philosophers in our sample believe that philosophers possess an improved ability to both analyze and judge moral problems and that they commonly see these two capacities as going hand in hand. We also point at significant associations between personal and professional attributes and philosophers’ beliefs, such as age, working in the field of moral philosophy, public involvement, and association with the analytic tradition. We discuss the implications of these findings for the debate about moral expertise. John Wiley and Sons Inc. 2022-08-16 2022-11 /pmc/articles/PMC9804195/ /pubmed/35971892 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13079 Text en © 2022 The Authors. Bioethics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/This is an open access article under the terms of the http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non‐commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made. |
spellingShingle | Original Articles Niv, Yarden Sulitzeanu‐Kenan, Raanan An empirical perspective on moral expertise: Evidence from a global study of philosophers |
title | An empirical perspective on moral expertise: Evidence from a global study of philosophers |
title_full | An empirical perspective on moral expertise: Evidence from a global study of philosophers |
title_fullStr | An empirical perspective on moral expertise: Evidence from a global study of philosophers |
title_full_unstemmed | An empirical perspective on moral expertise: Evidence from a global study of philosophers |
title_short | An empirical perspective on moral expertise: Evidence from a global study of philosophers |
title_sort | empirical perspective on moral expertise: evidence from a global study of philosophers |
topic | Original Articles |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9804195/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35971892 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13079 |
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