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Environmental Regulation Competition and Carbon Emissions

To clarify the relationship between environmental regulatory competition and carbon emissions and provide a theoretical basis for carbon emission reduction governance, this paper explores the strategic interaction behavior of environmental regulatory competition by constructing a three-way evolution...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Cui, Lizhi, Ding, Yining, Li, Xiangqian
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9819419/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36613054
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph20010736
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author Cui, Lizhi
Ding, Yining
Li, Xiangqian
author_facet Cui, Lizhi
Ding, Yining
Li, Xiangqian
author_sort Cui, Lizhi
collection PubMed
description To clarify the relationship between environmental regulatory competition and carbon emissions and provide a theoretical basis for carbon emission reduction governance, this paper explores the strategic interaction behavior of environmental regulatory competition by constructing a three-way evolutionary game model based on the perspective of the fusion of environmental federalism and local government competition theory. On this basis, the specific forms of carbon emission reduction competition are tested using the spatial Durbin model, and the mechanism of the effect of environmental regulation competition on carbon emissions is analyzed. The evolutionary game model shows that local governments make strategic choices based on the costs and benefits of environmental regulation, and there are strategic equilibria of “race to the bottom”, “race to the top”, and “differentiation of competition”. The empirical results show that the competition for environmental regulations as a whole after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China is a “race to the top”, and the increase in the intensity of environmental regulations has an inhibitory effect on carbon emissions, which remains valid after a series of robustness tests. There is heterogeneity in environmental regulatory competition, and the effect of emissions reduction is most obvious in the central region. Mechanism analysis shows that environmental regulatory competition affects carbon emissions mainly through the effect of political performance assessment, the effect of industrial structure optimization, and the effect of low-carbon technology capability improvement. Therefore, the central government should follow the local government interest function and balance the interests of all parties, appropriately increase the proportion of environmental performance assessment and optimize the performance assessment system, and consider regional development differences to find the right carbon emissions reduction path.
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spelling pubmed-98194192023-01-07 Environmental Regulation Competition and Carbon Emissions Cui, Lizhi Ding, Yining Li, Xiangqian Int J Environ Res Public Health Article To clarify the relationship between environmental regulatory competition and carbon emissions and provide a theoretical basis for carbon emission reduction governance, this paper explores the strategic interaction behavior of environmental regulatory competition by constructing a three-way evolutionary game model based on the perspective of the fusion of environmental federalism and local government competition theory. On this basis, the specific forms of carbon emission reduction competition are tested using the spatial Durbin model, and the mechanism of the effect of environmental regulation competition on carbon emissions is analyzed. The evolutionary game model shows that local governments make strategic choices based on the costs and benefits of environmental regulation, and there are strategic equilibria of “race to the bottom”, “race to the top”, and “differentiation of competition”. The empirical results show that the competition for environmental regulations as a whole after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China is a “race to the top”, and the increase in the intensity of environmental regulations has an inhibitory effect on carbon emissions, which remains valid after a series of robustness tests. There is heterogeneity in environmental regulatory competition, and the effect of emissions reduction is most obvious in the central region. Mechanism analysis shows that environmental regulatory competition affects carbon emissions mainly through the effect of political performance assessment, the effect of industrial structure optimization, and the effect of low-carbon technology capability improvement. Therefore, the central government should follow the local government interest function and balance the interests of all parties, appropriately increase the proportion of environmental performance assessment and optimize the performance assessment system, and consider regional development differences to find the right carbon emissions reduction path. MDPI 2022-12-30 /pmc/articles/PMC9819419/ /pubmed/36613054 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph20010736 Text en © 2022 by the authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Cui, Lizhi
Ding, Yining
Li, Xiangqian
Environmental Regulation Competition and Carbon Emissions
title Environmental Regulation Competition and Carbon Emissions
title_full Environmental Regulation Competition and Carbon Emissions
title_fullStr Environmental Regulation Competition and Carbon Emissions
title_full_unstemmed Environmental Regulation Competition and Carbon Emissions
title_short Environmental Regulation Competition and Carbon Emissions
title_sort environmental regulation competition and carbon emissions
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9819419/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36613054
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph20010736
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