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Social Distancing Network Creation

During a pandemic people have to find a trade-off between meeting others and staying safely at home. While meeting others is pleasant, it also increases the risk of infection. We consider this dilemma by introducing a game-theoretic network creation model in which selfish agents can form bilateral c...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Friedrich, Tobias, Gawendowicz, Hans, Lenzner, Pascal, Melnichenko, Anna
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer US 2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9834708/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36686067
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00453-022-01089-6
Descripción
Sumario:During a pandemic people have to find a trade-off between meeting others and staying safely at home. While meeting others is pleasant, it also increases the risk of infection. We consider this dilemma by introducing a game-theoretic network creation model in which selfish agents can form bilateral connections. They benefit from network neighbors, but at the same time, they want to maximize their distance to all other agents. This models the inherent conflict that social distancing rules impose on the behavior of selfish agents in a social network. Besides addressing this familiar issue, our model can be seen as the inverse to the well-studied Network Creation Game by Fabrikant et al. (in: PODC 2003, pp 347–351, 2003. 10.1145/872035.872088), where agents aim at being as central as possible in the created network. We look at two variants of network creation governed by social distancing. Firstly, a variant without connection restrictions, where we characterize optimal and equilibrium networks, and derive asymptotically tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability. The second variant allows connection restrictions. As our main result, we prove that Swap-Maximal Routing-Cost Spanning Trees, an efficiently computable weaker variant of Maximum Routing-Cost Spanning Trees, actually resemble equilibria for a significant range of the parameter space. Moreover, we give almost tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability. These results imply that under social distancing the agents’ selfishness has a strong impact on the quality of the equilibria.