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Attack–Defense Game Model with Multi-Type Attackers Considering Information Dilemma

Today, people rely heavily on infrastructure networks. Attacks on infrastructure networks can lead to significant property damage and production stagnation. The game theory provides a suitable theoretical framework for solving the problem of infrastructure protection. Existing models consider only t...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Qi, Gaoxin, Li, Jichao, Xu, Chi, Chen, Gang, Yang, Kewei
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9858562/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36673201
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e25010057
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author Qi, Gaoxin
Li, Jichao
Xu, Chi
Chen, Gang
Yang, Kewei
author_facet Qi, Gaoxin
Li, Jichao
Xu, Chi
Chen, Gang
Yang, Kewei
author_sort Qi, Gaoxin
collection PubMed
description Today, people rely heavily on infrastructure networks. Attacks on infrastructure networks can lead to significant property damage and production stagnation. The game theory provides a suitable theoretical framework for solving the problem of infrastructure protection. Existing models consider only the beneficial effects that the defender obtains from information gaps. If the attacker’s countermeasures are ignored, the defender will become passive. Herein, we consider that a proficient attacker with a probability in the game can fill information gaps in the network. First, we introduce the link-hiding rule and the information dilemma. Second, based on the Bayesian static game model, we establish an attack–defense game model with multiple types of attackers. In the game model, we consider resource-consistent and different types of distributions of the attacker. Then, we introduce the solution method of our model by combining the Harsanyi transformation and the bi-matrix game. Finally, we conduct experiments using a scale-free network. The result shows that the defender can be benefited by hiding some links when facing a normal attacker or by estimating the distribution of the attacker correctly. The defender will experience a loss if it ignores the proficient attacker or misestimates the distribution.
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spelling pubmed-98585622023-01-21 Attack–Defense Game Model with Multi-Type Attackers Considering Information Dilemma Qi, Gaoxin Li, Jichao Xu, Chi Chen, Gang Yang, Kewei Entropy (Basel) Article Today, people rely heavily on infrastructure networks. Attacks on infrastructure networks can lead to significant property damage and production stagnation. The game theory provides a suitable theoretical framework for solving the problem of infrastructure protection. Existing models consider only the beneficial effects that the defender obtains from information gaps. If the attacker’s countermeasures are ignored, the defender will become passive. Herein, we consider that a proficient attacker with a probability in the game can fill information gaps in the network. First, we introduce the link-hiding rule and the information dilemma. Second, based on the Bayesian static game model, we establish an attack–defense game model with multiple types of attackers. In the game model, we consider resource-consistent and different types of distributions of the attacker. Then, we introduce the solution method of our model by combining the Harsanyi transformation and the bi-matrix game. Finally, we conduct experiments using a scale-free network. The result shows that the defender can be benefited by hiding some links when facing a normal attacker or by estimating the distribution of the attacker correctly. The defender will experience a loss if it ignores the proficient attacker or misestimates the distribution. MDPI 2022-12-28 /pmc/articles/PMC9858562/ /pubmed/36673201 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e25010057 Text en © 2022 by the authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Qi, Gaoxin
Li, Jichao
Xu, Chi
Chen, Gang
Yang, Kewei
Attack–Defense Game Model with Multi-Type Attackers Considering Information Dilemma
title Attack–Defense Game Model with Multi-Type Attackers Considering Information Dilemma
title_full Attack–Defense Game Model with Multi-Type Attackers Considering Information Dilemma
title_fullStr Attack–Defense Game Model with Multi-Type Attackers Considering Information Dilemma
title_full_unstemmed Attack–Defense Game Model with Multi-Type Attackers Considering Information Dilemma
title_short Attack–Defense Game Model with Multi-Type Attackers Considering Information Dilemma
title_sort attack–defense game model with multi-type attackers considering information dilemma
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9858562/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36673201
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e25010057
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