Research on multiple co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution in China on the perspective of ENGOs and public participation

Effective prevention and control of agricultural non-point source pollution is a major challenge faced by the Chinese local government in the context of rural revitalization, and clarifying the game relationship between stakeholders in agricultural non-point source pollution control actions will help achieve multiple co-governance better. Accordingly, this paper discusses the interactive decision-making relationships between local government and livestock and poultry breeding enterprise (LPBE) under the participation of Environmental non-government organizations (ENGOs) and public, by constructing an evolutionary game model, as well as analyzing evolutionary cooperative stability strategies and realizing the simulation of evolution processes in different scenarios by MATLAB. The results show that government subsidy has an incentive effect on LPBE to adopt the purifying strategy, yet reduces the enthusiasm of local government for supervision. Improving the participation degree and right space of ENGOs is conducive to the realization of multiple co-governance models. Furthermore, the impact of public participation on multiple co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution is related to the local government’s investigation rate and the public reporting fairness; strengthening the local government’s supervision capacity and improving the public reporting fairness can achieve better collaborative governance effects.