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Investigating coordinated account creation using burst detection and network analysis

Democracies around the world face the threat of manipulation of their electorates via coordinated online influence campaigns. Researchers have responded by developing valuable methods for finding automated accounts and identifying false information, but these valiant efforts often fall into a cat-an...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Bellutta, Daniele, Carley, Kathleen M.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer International Publishing 2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9913025/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36818687
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s40537-023-00695-7
Descripción
Sumario:Democracies around the world face the threat of manipulation of their electorates via coordinated online influence campaigns. Researchers have responded by developing valuable methods for finding automated accounts and identifying false information, but these valiant efforts often fall into a cat-and-mouse game with perpetrators who constantly change their behavior. This has forced several researchers to go beyond the detection of individual malicious actors by instead identifying the coordinated activity that propels potent information operations. In this vein, we provide rigorous quantitative evidence for the notion that sudden increases in Twitter account creations may provide early warnings of online information operations. Analysis of fourteen months of tweets discussing the 2020 U.S. elections revealed that accounts created during bursts exhibited more similar behavior, showed more agreement on mail-in voting and mask wearing, and were more likely to be bots and share links to low-credibility sites. In concert with other techniques for detecting nefarious activity, social media platforms could temporarily limit the influence of accounts created during these bursts. Given the advantages of combining multiple anti-misinformation methods, we join others in presenting a case for the need to develop more integrable methods for countering online influence campaigns. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s40537-023-00695-7.