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Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks
We consider a dynamic principal–agent model that naturally extends the classical Holmström–Milgrom setting to include a risk capable of stopping production completely. We obtain an explicit characterization of the optimal wage along with the optimal action provided by the agent. The optimal contract...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Springer International Publishing
2023
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9916515/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10203-023-00386-1 |