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Performance Analysis of Software-Defined Networks to Mitigate Private VLAN Attacks

The defence-in-depth (DiD) methodology is a defensive approach usually performed by network administrators to implement secure networks by layering and segmenting them. Typically, segmentation is implemented in the second layer using the standard virtual local area networks (VLANs) or private virtua...

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Autores principales: Álvarez, David, Nuño, Pelayo, González, Carlos T., Bulnes, Francisco G., Granda, Juan C., García-Carrillo, Dan
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9961207/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36850345
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s23041747
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author Álvarez, David
Nuño, Pelayo
González, Carlos T.
Bulnes, Francisco G.
Granda, Juan C.
García-Carrillo, Dan
author_facet Álvarez, David
Nuño, Pelayo
González, Carlos T.
Bulnes, Francisco G.
Granda, Juan C.
García-Carrillo, Dan
author_sort Álvarez, David
collection PubMed
description The defence-in-depth (DiD) methodology is a defensive approach usually performed by network administrators to implement secure networks by layering and segmenting them. Typically, segmentation is implemented in the second layer using the standard virtual local area networks (VLANs) or private virtual local area networks (PVLANs). Although defence in depth is usually manageable in small networks, it is not easily scalable to larger environments. Software-defined networks (SDNs) are emerging technologies that can be very helpful when performing network segmentation in such environments. In this work, a corporate networking scenario using PVLANs is emulated in order to carry out a comparative performance analysis on defensive strategies regarding CPU and memory usage, communications delay, packet loss, and power consumption. To do so, a well-known PVLAN attack is executed using simulated attackers located within the corporate network. Then, two mitigation strategies are analysed and compared using the traditional approach involving access control lists (ACLs) and SDNs. The results show the operation of the two mitigation strategies under different network scenarios and demonstrate the better performance of the SDN approach in oversubscribed network designs.
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spelling pubmed-99612072023-02-26 Performance Analysis of Software-Defined Networks to Mitigate Private VLAN Attacks Álvarez, David Nuño, Pelayo González, Carlos T. Bulnes, Francisco G. Granda, Juan C. García-Carrillo, Dan Sensors (Basel) Article The defence-in-depth (DiD) methodology is a defensive approach usually performed by network administrators to implement secure networks by layering and segmenting them. Typically, segmentation is implemented in the second layer using the standard virtual local area networks (VLANs) or private virtual local area networks (PVLANs). Although defence in depth is usually manageable in small networks, it is not easily scalable to larger environments. Software-defined networks (SDNs) are emerging technologies that can be very helpful when performing network segmentation in such environments. In this work, a corporate networking scenario using PVLANs is emulated in order to carry out a comparative performance analysis on defensive strategies regarding CPU and memory usage, communications delay, packet loss, and power consumption. To do so, a well-known PVLAN attack is executed using simulated attackers located within the corporate network. Then, two mitigation strategies are analysed and compared using the traditional approach involving access control lists (ACLs) and SDNs. The results show the operation of the two mitigation strategies under different network scenarios and demonstrate the better performance of the SDN approach in oversubscribed network designs. MDPI 2023-02-04 /pmc/articles/PMC9961207/ /pubmed/36850345 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s23041747 Text en © 2023 by the authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Álvarez, David
Nuño, Pelayo
González, Carlos T.
Bulnes, Francisco G.
Granda, Juan C.
García-Carrillo, Dan
Performance Analysis of Software-Defined Networks to Mitigate Private VLAN Attacks
title Performance Analysis of Software-Defined Networks to Mitigate Private VLAN Attacks
title_full Performance Analysis of Software-Defined Networks to Mitigate Private VLAN Attacks
title_fullStr Performance Analysis of Software-Defined Networks to Mitigate Private VLAN Attacks
title_full_unstemmed Performance Analysis of Software-Defined Networks to Mitigate Private VLAN Attacks
title_short Performance Analysis of Software-Defined Networks to Mitigate Private VLAN Attacks
title_sort performance analysis of software-defined networks to mitigate private vlan attacks
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9961207/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36850345
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s23041747
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