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Evolution Game Analysis of Hospital Governance Strategy in Industrial Parks in China

Industrial parks are an essential component of China’s reformation and opening, and they are the focus of sustainable economic and social development. However, in the process of further high-quality development, the relevant authorities have taken different approaches on whether to divest the social...

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Autores principales: Zhen, Jie, Yang, Senmiao
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9964699/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36833853
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph20043156
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author Zhen, Jie
Yang, Senmiao
author_facet Zhen, Jie
Yang, Senmiao
author_sort Zhen, Jie
collection PubMed
description Industrial parks are an essential component of China’s reformation and opening, and they are the focus of sustainable economic and social development. However, in the process of further high-quality development, the relevant authorities have taken different approaches on whether to divest the social management functions of the parks, which introduces a dilemma of choice in reforming the management functions of these parks. This paper takes a comprehensive list of the hospitals providing public services in industrial parks as the representative subjects to clarify the factors influencing the selection of social management functions in industrial parks and the process in which they perform their roles. We also construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, the industrial parks, and the hospitals and discuss the management functions of reform in industrial parks. The results show the following: (1) the selection of social management functions in industrial parks is an evolutionary game process of the government, park, and hospital under bounded rationality; (2) whether the government divests the park’s administrative authority over the hospital is affected by the cost of the government running the hospital and the additional benefits of the hospital’s participation in the business environment co-creation; (3) whether the industrial park provides high subsidies to the hospital is affected by its reputation benefit and subsidy cost; (4) whether the hospital participates in business environment co-creation is affected by additional benefits, subsidies, and its participation cost. When considering whether the local government should strip the social management function of the park over the hospital, it is not possible to simply “choose one of the two” or adopt a “one-size-fits-all” approach. Instead, attention should be paid to the factors influencing the choice of the main behaviors of all parties, the allocation of resources from the overall perspective of regional economic and social development, and jointly improving the business environment to achieve win–win results among all parties.
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spelling pubmed-99646992023-02-26 Evolution Game Analysis of Hospital Governance Strategy in Industrial Parks in China Zhen, Jie Yang, Senmiao Int J Environ Res Public Health Article Industrial parks are an essential component of China’s reformation and opening, and they are the focus of sustainable economic and social development. However, in the process of further high-quality development, the relevant authorities have taken different approaches on whether to divest the social management functions of the parks, which introduces a dilemma of choice in reforming the management functions of these parks. This paper takes a comprehensive list of the hospitals providing public services in industrial parks as the representative subjects to clarify the factors influencing the selection of social management functions in industrial parks and the process in which they perform their roles. We also construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, the industrial parks, and the hospitals and discuss the management functions of reform in industrial parks. The results show the following: (1) the selection of social management functions in industrial parks is an evolutionary game process of the government, park, and hospital under bounded rationality; (2) whether the government divests the park’s administrative authority over the hospital is affected by the cost of the government running the hospital and the additional benefits of the hospital’s participation in the business environment co-creation; (3) whether the industrial park provides high subsidies to the hospital is affected by its reputation benefit and subsidy cost; (4) whether the hospital participates in business environment co-creation is affected by additional benefits, subsidies, and its participation cost. When considering whether the local government should strip the social management function of the park over the hospital, it is not possible to simply “choose one of the two” or adopt a “one-size-fits-all” approach. Instead, attention should be paid to the factors influencing the choice of the main behaviors of all parties, the allocation of resources from the overall perspective of regional economic and social development, and jointly improving the business environment to achieve win–win results among all parties. MDPI 2023-02-10 /pmc/articles/PMC9964699/ /pubmed/36833853 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph20043156 Text en © 2023 by the authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Zhen, Jie
Yang, Senmiao
Evolution Game Analysis of Hospital Governance Strategy in Industrial Parks in China
title Evolution Game Analysis of Hospital Governance Strategy in Industrial Parks in China
title_full Evolution Game Analysis of Hospital Governance Strategy in Industrial Parks in China
title_fullStr Evolution Game Analysis of Hospital Governance Strategy in Industrial Parks in China
title_full_unstemmed Evolution Game Analysis of Hospital Governance Strategy in Industrial Parks in China
title_short Evolution Game Analysis of Hospital Governance Strategy in Industrial Parks in China
title_sort evolution game analysis of hospital governance strategy in industrial parks in china
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9964699/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36833853
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph20043156
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