Policy choices and compliance behavior in pandemic times

In this paper, we model an evolutionary noncooperative game between politicians and citizens that, given the level of infection, describes the observed variety of mitigation policies and citizens’ compliance during the COVID-19 pandemic period. Our results show that different stable equilibria exist...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Calcagnini, Giorgio, Pavlinović Mršić, Slađana, Policardo, Laura, Sanchez Carrera, Edgar J.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2023
Materias:
Regular Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10039362/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37359051
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11403-023-00380-1

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10039362/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37359051
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11403-023-00380-1

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