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Outlearning extortioners: unbending strategies can foster reciprocal fairness and cooperation
Recent theory shows that extortioners taking advantage of the zero-determinant (ZD) strategy can unilaterally claim an unfair share of the payoffs in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. It is thus suggested that against a fixed extortioner, any adapting coplayer should be subdued with full cooperation...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
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Oxford University Press
2023
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| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10244001/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37287707 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgad176 |