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Outlearning extortioners: unbending strategies can foster reciprocal fairness and cooperation

Recent theory shows that extortioners taking advantage of the zero-determinant (ZD) strategy can unilaterally claim an unfair share of the payoffs in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. It is thus suggested that against a fixed extortioner, any adapting coplayer should be subdued with full cooperation...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Chen, Xingru, Fu, Feng
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Oxford University Press 2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10244001/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37287707
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgad176

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