Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games

We analyze the performance of the best-response dynamic across all normal-form games using a random games approach. The playing sequence—the order in which players update their actions—is essentially irrelevant in determining whether the dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium in certain classes of...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Heinrich, Torsten, Jang, Yoojin, Mungo, Luca, Pangallo, Marco, Scott, Alex, Tarbush, Bassel, Wiese, Samuel
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2023
Materias:
Original Paper
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10494490/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37700906
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00837-4

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10494490/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37700906
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00837-4

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