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Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games
We analyze the performance of the best-response dynamic across all normal-form games using a random games approach. The playing sequence—the order in which players update their actions—is essentially irrelevant in determining whether the dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium in certain classes of...
| Autores principales: | , , , , , , |
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2023
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10494490/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/37700906 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00837-4 |