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Secondary uses and the governance of de-identified data: Lessons from the human genome diversity panel
BACKGROUND: Recent changes to regulatory guidance in the US and Europe have complicated oversight of secondary research by rendering most uses of de-identified data exempt from human subjects oversight. To identify the implications of such guidelines for harms to participants and communities, this p...
Autores principales: | , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
BioMed Central
2011
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3195203/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21943371 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1472-6939-12-16 |
Sumario: | BACKGROUND: Recent changes to regulatory guidance in the US and Europe have complicated oversight of secondary research by rendering most uses of de-identified data exempt from human subjects oversight. To identify the implications of such guidelines for harms to participants and communities, this paper explores the secondary uses of one de-identified DNA sample collection with limited oversight: the Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP)-Centre d'Etude du Polymorphisme Humain, Fondation Jean Dausset (CEPH) Human Genome Diversity Panel. METHODS: Using a combination of keyword and cited reference search, we identified English-language scientific articles published between 2002 and 2009 that reported analysis of HGDP Diversity Panel samples and/or data. We then reviewed each article to identify the specific research use to which the samples and/or data was applied. Secondary uses were categorized according to the type and kind of research supported by the collection. RESULTS: A wide variety of secondary uses were identified from 148 peer-reviewed articles. While the vast majority of these uses were consistent with the original intent of the collection, a minority of published reports described research whose primary findings could be regarded as controversial, objectionable, or potentially stigmatizing in their interpretation. CONCLUSIONS: We conclude that potential risks to participants and communities cannot be wholly eliminated by anonymization of individual data and suggest that explicit review of proposed secondary uses, by a Data Access Committee or similar internal oversight body with suitable stakeholder representation, should be a required component of the trustworthy governance of any repository of data or specimens. |
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