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Inferring Reputation Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Social Dilemma Games

In realistic world individuals with high reputation are more likely to influence the collective behaviors. Due to the cost and error of information dissemination, however, it is unreasonable to assign each individual with a complete cognitive power, which means that not everyone can accurately reali...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Wang, Zhen, Wang, Lin, Yin, Zi-Yu, Xia, Cheng-Yi
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Public Library of Science 2012
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3392274/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22808120
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0040218