Cargando…

Inferring Reputation Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Social Dilemma Games

In realistic world individuals with high reputation are more likely to influence the collective behaviors. Due to the cost and error of information dissemination, however, it is unreasonable to assign each individual with a complete cognitive power, which means that not everyone can accurately reali...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Wang, Zhen, Wang, Lin, Yin, Zi-Yu, Xia, Cheng-Yi
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Public Library of Science 2012
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3392274/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22808120
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0040218
_version_ 1782237614591442944
author Wang, Zhen
Wang, Lin
Yin, Zi-Yu
Xia, Cheng-Yi
author_facet Wang, Zhen
Wang, Lin
Yin, Zi-Yu
Xia, Cheng-Yi
author_sort Wang, Zhen
collection PubMed
description In realistic world individuals with high reputation are more likely to influence the collective behaviors. Due to the cost and error of information dissemination, however, it is unreasonable to assign each individual with a complete cognitive power, which means that not everyone can accurately realize others’ reputation situation. Here we introduce the mechanism of inferring reputation into the selection of potential strategy sources to explore the evolution of cooperation. Before the game each player is assigned with a randomly distributed parameter p denoting his ability to infer the reputation of others. The parameter p of each individual is kept constant during the game. The value of p indicates that the neighbor possessing highest reputation is chosen with the probability p and randomly choosing an opponent is left with the probability 1−p. We find that this novel mechanism can be seen as an universally applicable promoter of cooperation, which works on various interaction networks and in different types of evolutionary game. Of particular interest is the fact that, in the early stages of evolutionary process, cooperators with high reputation who are easily regarded as the potential strategy donors can quickly lead to the formation of extremely robust clusters of cooperators that are impervious to defector attacks. These clusters eventually help cooperators reach their undisputed dominance, which transcends what can be warranted by the spatial reciprocity alone. Moreover, we provide complete phase diagrams to depict the impact of uncertainty in strategy adoptions and conclude that the effective interaction topology structure may be altered under such a mechanism. When the estimation of reputation is extended, we also show that the moderate value of evaluation factor enables cooperation to thrive best. We thus present a viable method of understanding the ubiquitous cooperative behaviors in nature and hope that it will inspire further studies to resolve social dilemmas.
format Online
Article
Text
id pubmed-3392274
institution National Center for Biotechnology Information
language English
publishDate 2012
publisher Public Library of Science
record_format MEDLINE/PubMed
spelling pubmed-33922742012-07-17 Inferring Reputation Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Social Dilemma Games Wang, Zhen Wang, Lin Yin, Zi-Yu Xia, Cheng-Yi PLoS One Research Article In realistic world individuals with high reputation are more likely to influence the collective behaviors. Due to the cost and error of information dissemination, however, it is unreasonable to assign each individual with a complete cognitive power, which means that not everyone can accurately realize others’ reputation situation. Here we introduce the mechanism of inferring reputation into the selection of potential strategy sources to explore the evolution of cooperation. Before the game each player is assigned with a randomly distributed parameter p denoting his ability to infer the reputation of others. The parameter p of each individual is kept constant during the game. The value of p indicates that the neighbor possessing highest reputation is chosen with the probability p and randomly choosing an opponent is left with the probability 1−p. We find that this novel mechanism can be seen as an universally applicable promoter of cooperation, which works on various interaction networks and in different types of evolutionary game. Of particular interest is the fact that, in the early stages of evolutionary process, cooperators with high reputation who are easily regarded as the potential strategy donors can quickly lead to the formation of extremely robust clusters of cooperators that are impervious to defector attacks. These clusters eventually help cooperators reach their undisputed dominance, which transcends what can be warranted by the spatial reciprocity alone. Moreover, we provide complete phase diagrams to depict the impact of uncertainty in strategy adoptions and conclude that the effective interaction topology structure may be altered under such a mechanism. When the estimation of reputation is extended, we also show that the moderate value of evaluation factor enables cooperation to thrive best. We thus present a viable method of understanding the ubiquitous cooperative behaviors in nature and hope that it will inspire further studies to resolve social dilemmas. Public Library of Science 2012-07-09 /pmc/articles/PMC3392274/ /pubmed/22808120 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0040218 Text en Wang et al. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are properly credited.
spellingShingle Research Article
Wang, Zhen
Wang, Lin
Yin, Zi-Yu
Xia, Cheng-Yi
Inferring Reputation Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Social Dilemma Games
title Inferring Reputation Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Social Dilemma Games
title_full Inferring Reputation Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Social Dilemma Games
title_fullStr Inferring Reputation Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Social Dilemma Games
title_full_unstemmed Inferring Reputation Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Social Dilemma Games
title_short Inferring Reputation Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Social Dilemma Games
title_sort inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma games
topic Research Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3392274/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22808120
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0040218
work_keys_str_mv AT wangzhen inferringreputationpromotestheevolutionofcooperationinspatialsocialdilemmagames
AT wanglin inferringreputationpromotestheevolutionofcooperationinspatialsocialdilemmagames
AT yinziyu inferringreputationpromotestheevolutionofcooperationinspatialsocialdilemmagames
AT xiachengyi inferringreputationpromotestheevolutionofcooperationinspatialsocialdilemmagames