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Three is a crowd in iterated prisoner's dilemmas: experimental evidence on reciprocal behavior

Reciprocity or conditional cooperation is one of the most prominent mechanisms proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent experimental findings on networked games suggest that conditional cooperation may also depend on the previous action of the player. We here repor...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Grujić, Jelena, Eke, Burcu, Cabrales, Antonio, Cuesta, José A., Sánchez, Angel
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Nature Publishing Group 2012
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3435562/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22962633
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep00638