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Three is a crowd in iterated prisoner's dilemmas: experimental evidence on reciprocal behavior

Reciprocity or conditional cooperation is one of the most prominent mechanisms proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent experimental findings on networked games suggest that conditional cooperation may also depend on the previous action of the player. We here repor...

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Autores principales: Grujić, Jelena, Eke, Burcu, Cabrales, Antonio, Cuesta, José A., Sánchez, Angel
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Nature Publishing Group 2012
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3435562/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22962633
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep00638
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author Grujić, Jelena
Eke, Burcu
Cabrales, Antonio
Cuesta, José A.
Sánchez, Angel
author_facet Grujić, Jelena
Eke, Burcu
Cabrales, Antonio
Cuesta, José A.
Sánchez, Angel
author_sort Grujić, Jelena
collection PubMed
description Reciprocity or conditional cooperation is one of the most prominent mechanisms proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent experimental findings on networked games suggest that conditional cooperation may also depend on the previous action of the player. We here report on experiments on iterated, multi-player Prisoner's dilemma, on groups of 2 to 5 people. We confirm the dependence on the previous step and that memory effects for earlier periods are not significant. We show that the behavior of subjects in pairwise dilemmas is qualitatively different from the cases with more players; After an initial decay, cooperation increases significantly reaching values above 80%. The strategy of the players is rather universal as far as their willingness to reciprocate cooperation is concerned, whereas there is much diversity in their initial propensity to cooperate. Our results indicate that, for cooperation to emerge and thrive, three is a crowd.
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spelling pubmed-34355622012-09-07 Three is a crowd in iterated prisoner's dilemmas: experimental evidence on reciprocal behavior Grujić, Jelena Eke, Burcu Cabrales, Antonio Cuesta, José A. Sánchez, Angel Sci Rep Article Reciprocity or conditional cooperation is one of the most prominent mechanisms proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent experimental findings on networked games suggest that conditional cooperation may also depend on the previous action of the player. We here report on experiments on iterated, multi-player Prisoner's dilemma, on groups of 2 to 5 people. We confirm the dependence on the previous step and that memory effects for earlier periods are not significant. We show that the behavior of subjects in pairwise dilemmas is qualitatively different from the cases with more players; After an initial decay, cooperation increases significantly reaching values above 80%. The strategy of the players is rather universal as far as their willingness to reciprocate cooperation is concerned, whereas there is much diversity in their initial propensity to cooperate. Our results indicate that, for cooperation to emerge and thrive, three is a crowd. Nature Publishing Group 2012-09-07 /pmc/articles/PMC3435562/ /pubmed/22962633 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep00638 Text en Copyright © 2012, Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareALike 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/
spellingShingle Article
Grujić, Jelena
Eke, Burcu
Cabrales, Antonio
Cuesta, José A.
Sánchez, Angel
Three is a crowd in iterated prisoner's dilemmas: experimental evidence on reciprocal behavior
title Three is a crowd in iterated prisoner's dilemmas: experimental evidence on reciprocal behavior
title_full Three is a crowd in iterated prisoner's dilemmas: experimental evidence on reciprocal behavior
title_fullStr Three is a crowd in iterated prisoner's dilemmas: experimental evidence on reciprocal behavior
title_full_unstemmed Three is a crowd in iterated prisoner's dilemmas: experimental evidence on reciprocal behavior
title_short Three is a crowd in iterated prisoner's dilemmas: experimental evidence on reciprocal behavior
title_sort three is a crowd in iterated prisoner's dilemmas: experimental evidence on reciprocal behavior
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3435562/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22962633
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep00638
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