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Three is a crowd in iterated prisoner's dilemmas: experimental evidence on reciprocal behavior
Reciprocity or conditional cooperation is one of the most prominent mechanisms proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent experimental findings on networked games suggest that conditional cooperation may also depend on the previous action of the player. We here repor...
| Autores principales: | , , , , |
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group
2012
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3435562/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22962633 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep00638 |