The Evolution of Strategic Timing in Collective-Risk Dilemmas

In collective-risk dilemmas, a group needs to collaborate over time to avoid a catastrophic event. This gives rise to a coordination game with many equilibria, including equilibria where no one contributes, and thus no measures against the catastrophe are taken. In this game, the timing of contribut...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Hilbe, Christian, Abou Chakra, Maria, Altrock, Philipp M., Traulsen, Arne
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Public Library of Science 2013
Materias:
Research Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3682992/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23799109
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0066490

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3682992/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23799109
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0066490

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