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The Evolution of Strategic Timing in Collective-Risk Dilemmas

In collective-risk dilemmas, a group needs to collaborate over time to avoid a catastrophic event. This gives rise to a coordination game with many equilibria, including equilibria where no one contributes, and thus no measures against the catastrophe are taken. In this game, the timing of contribut...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Hilbe, Christian, Abou Chakra, Maria, Altrock, Philipp M., Traulsen, Arne
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Public Library of Science 2013
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3682992/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23799109
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0066490
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author Hilbe, Christian
Abou Chakra, Maria
Altrock, Philipp M.
Traulsen, Arne
author_facet Hilbe, Christian
Abou Chakra, Maria
Altrock, Philipp M.
Traulsen, Arne
author_sort Hilbe, Christian
collection PubMed
description In collective-risk dilemmas, a group needs to collaborate over time to avoid a catastrophic event. This gives rise to a coordination game with many equilibria, including equilibria where no one contributes, and thus no measures against the catastrophe are taken. In this game, the timing of contributions becomes a strategic variable that allows individuals to interact and influence one another. Herein, we use evolutionary game theory to study the impact of strategic timing on equilibrium selection. Depending on the risk of catastrophe, we identify three characteristic regimes. For low risks, defection is the only equilibrium, whereas high risks promote equilibria with sufficient contributions. Intermediate risks pose the biggest challenge for cooperation. In this risk regime, the option to interact over time is critical; if individuals can contribute over several rounds, then the group has a higher chance to succeed, and the expected welfare increases. This positive effect of timing is of particular importance in larger groups, where successful coordination becomes increasingly difficult.
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spelling pubmed-36829922013-06-24 The Evolution of Strategic Timing in Collective-Risk Dilemmas Hilbe, Christian Abou Chakra, Maria Altrock, Philipp M. Traulsen, Arne PLoS One Research Article In collective-risk dilemmas, a group needs to collaborate over time to avoid a catastrophic event. This gives rise to a coordination game with many equilibria, including equilibria where no one contributes, and thus no measures against the catastrophe are taken. In this game, the timing of contributions becomes a strategic variable that allows individuals to interact and influence one another. Herein, we use evolutionary game theory to study the impact of strategic timing on equilibrium selection. Depending on the risk of catastrophe, we identify three characteristic regimes. For low risks, defection is the only equilibrium, whereas high risks promote equilibria with sufficient contributions. Intermediate risks pose the biggest challenge for cooperation. In this risk regime, the option to interact over time is critical; if individuals can contribute over several rounds, then the group has a higher chance to succeed, and the expected welfare increases. This positive effect of timing is of particular importance in larger groups, where successful coordination becomes increasingly difficult. Public Library of Science 2013-06-14 /pmc/articles/PMC3682992/ /pubmed/23799109 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0066490 Text en © 2013 Hilbe et al http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are properly credited.
spellingShingle Research Article
Hilbe, Christian
Abou Chakra, Maria
Altrock, Philipp M.
Traulsen, Arne
The Evolution of Strategic Timing in Collective-Risk Dilemmas
title The Evolution of Strategic Timing in Collective-Risk Dilemmas
title_full The Evolution of Strategic Timing in Collective-Risk Dilemmas
title_fullStr The Evolution of Strategic Timing in Collective-Risk Dilemmas
title_full_unstemmed The Evolution of Strategic Timing in Collective-Risk Dilemmas
title_short The Evolution of Strategic Timing in Collective-Risk Dilemmas
title_sort evolution of strategic timing in collective-risk dilemmas
topic Research Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3682992/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23799109
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0066490
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