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The Evolution of Strategic Timing in Collective-Risk Dilemmas
In collective-risk dilemmas, a group needs to collaborate over time to avoid a catastrophic event. This gives rise to a coordination game with many equilibria, including equilibria where no one contributes, and thus no measures against the catastrophe are taken. In this game, the timing of contribut...
| Autores principales: | , , , |
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Public Library of Science
2013
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3682992/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23799109 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0066490 |