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Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations with zealots

We investigate evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy matrix games with zealots in finite populations. Zealots are assumed to take either strategy regardless of the fitness. When the strategy selected by the zealots is the same, the fixation of the strategy selected by the zealots is a trivial outcom...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Nakajima, Yohei, Masuda, Naoki
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2014
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4289535/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24610380
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00285-014-0770-2