Spatial evolutionary public goods game on complete graph and dense complex networks

We study the spatial evolutionary public goods game (SEPGG) with voluntary or optional participation on a complete graph (CG) and on dense networks. Based on analyses of the SEPGG rate equation on finite CG, we find that SEPGG has two stable states depending on the value of multiplication factor r,...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Kim, Jinho, Chae, Huiseung, Yook, Soon-Hyung, Kim, Yup
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Nature Publishing Group 2015
Materias:
Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4369736/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25796988
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep09381

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4369736/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25796988
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep09381

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