The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation

Rewards and penalties are common practical tools that can be used to promote cooperation in social institutions. The evolution of cooperation under reward and punishment incentives in joint enterprises has been formalized and investigated, mostly by using compulsory public good games. Recently, Sasa...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Sasaki, Tatsuya
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer US 2013
Materias:
Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4811019/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27069751
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13235-013-0094-7

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4811019/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27069751
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13235-013-0094-7

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