A Mechanism for Fair Distribution of Resources without Payments

We design a mechanism for Fair and Efficient Distribution of Resources (FEDoR) in the presence of strategic agents. We consider a multiple-instances, Bayesian setting, where in each round the preference of an agent over the set of resources is a private information. We assume that in each of r round...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Christoforou, Evgenia, Anta, Antonio Fernández, Santos, Agustín
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Public Library of Science 2016
Materias:
Research Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4882081/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27227992
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0155962

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4882081/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27227992
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0155962

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