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A Mechanism for Fair Distribution of Resources without Payments
We design a mechanism for Fair and Efficient Distribution of Resources (FEDoR) in the presence of strategic agents. We consider a multiple-instances, Bayesian setting, where in each round the preference of an agent over the set of resources is a private information. We assume that in each of r round...
| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Public Library of Science
2016
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4882081/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27227992 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0155962 |