Co-action provides rational basis for the evolutionary success of Pavlovian strategies

Strategies incorporating direct reciprocity, e.g., Tit-for-Tat and Pavlov, have been shown to be successful for playing the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma (IPD), a paradigmatic problem for studying the evolution of cooperation among non-kin individuals. However it is an open question whether such recipr...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Sasidevan, V., Sinha, Sitabhra
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Nature Publishing Group 2016
Materias:
Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4967866/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27476604
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep30831

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4967866/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27476604
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep30831

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