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Co-action provides rational basis for the evolutionary success of Pavlovian strategies
Strategies incorporating direct reciprocity, e.g., Tit-for-Tat and Pavlov, have been shown to be successful for playing the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma (IPD), a paradigmatic problem for studying the evolution of cooperation among non-kin individuals. However it is an open question whether such recipr...
Autores principales: | Sasidevan, V., Sinha, Sitabhra |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group
2016
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4967866/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27476604 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep30831 |
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