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Patient dumping, outlier payments, and optimal healthcare payment policy under asymmetric information
We analyze a rationale for official authorization of patient dumping in the prospective payment policy framework. We show that when the insurer designs the healthcare payment policy to let hospitals dump high-cost patients, there is a trade-off between the disutility of dumped patients (changes in h...
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
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Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2016
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| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5167685/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27995577 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s13561-016-0135-1 |