Cargando…

Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Learning in finitely repeated games of cooperation remains poorly understood in part because their dynamics play out over a timescale exceeding that of traditional lab experiments. Here, we report results of a virtual lab experiment in which 94 subjects play up to 400 ten-round games of Prisoner...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Mao, Andrew, Dworkin, Lili, Suri, Siddharth, Watts, Duncan J.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Nature Publishing Group 2017
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5241863/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28082739
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/ncomms13800