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Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Learning in finitely repeated games of cooperation remains poorly understood in part because their dynamics play out over a timescale exceeding that of traditional lab experiments. Here, we report results of a virtual lab experiment in which 94 subjects play up to 400 ten-round games of Prisoner...
Autores principales: | Mao, Andrew, Dworkin, Lili, Suri, Siddharth, Watts, Duncan J. |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group
2017
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5241863/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28082739 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/ncomms13800 |
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