Cargando…
Bribery games on inter-dependent regular networks
We examine a scenario of social conflict that is manifest during an interaction between government servants providing a service and citizens who are legally entitled to the service, using evolutionary game-theory in structured populations characterized by an inter-dependent network. Bribe-demands by...
| Autores principales: | , , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group
2017
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5311942/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28205644 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep42735 |