How Social Preferences Shape Incentives in (Experimental) Markets for Credence Goods

Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies caused by superior information of sellers about the surplus‐maximising quality. While standard theory predicts that equal mark‐up prices solve the credence goods problem if customers can verify the quality received, experimental evidence indicates th...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Kerschbamer, Rudolf, Sutter, Matthias, Dulleck, Uwe
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: John Wiley and Sons Inc. 2016
Materias:
Articles
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5347901/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28344358
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12284

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5347901/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28344358
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12284

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